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HU M A NI S T S A R E G E A R I N G U P T O have a conversation about
digital research methods that will be interesting for many reasons—not least
because it’s oddly belated. Algorithmic mining of large electronic databases
has been quietly central to the humanities for two decades. We call this
practice ‘‘search,’’ but ‘‘search’’ is a deceptively modest name for a complex
technology that has come to play an evidentiary role in scholarship. Many of
the features that seem new to us about data mining (its ‘‘bigness’’ or quan-
titative character, for instance) have been invisibly naturalized in our dis-
ciplines since humanists started using full-text search in the 1990s. Although
data mining is widely framed as a novel technology now being imported to
the humanities, I’ll argue that it is better understood as a philosophical
discourse that can help humanists think more rigorously and deliberately
about existing practices of algorithmic research.
First, what does it mean to say that search plays an ‘‘evidentiary role in
scholarship’’? The appearance of paradox here is partly produced by the
word ‘‘search’’ itself, which blurs boundaries between distinct technologies.
Bibliographic search can be little more than an aid to memory—for instance,
if a scholar is recovering the call number for a known title. Full-text search
looks similar: we may even enter search terms in the same box where we
would have entered a title. But the underlying technology, and its scholarly
applications, are different.
In practice, a full-text search is often a Boolean fishing expedition for
a set of documents that may or may not exist. For instance, if I suspect that
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blushes are symbols of moral consciousness in nineteenth-century poetry,
I can go to a database of primary sources and search for poems that contain
both ‘‘blush’’ and ‘‘conscious.’’ If I find enough examples, I flesh out an
article. If not, I usually keep trying until I succeed. Perhaps ‘‘blush’’ and
‘‘shame’’ would work better? Here search is not just a finding aid; it’s anal-
ogous to experiment—although, to be sure, there’s something a bit dubious
about experiments that get repeated until they produce a desired result.
The search terms I have chosen encode a tacit hypothesis about the literary
significance of a symbol, and I feel my hypothesis is confirmed when I get
enough hits. It’s possible that the article I finally write will discuss only a few
of these sources, because I may not believe that the problem requires ‘‘big
data.’’ But in fact I’ve used algorithms to explore a big dataset, and the
search process may well have shaped my way of framing the subject, or my
intuitions about the representativeness of sources.
The internal mathematics of full-text search also has more in common
with data mining than with bibliographic retrieval. If I do a title search for
Moby-Dick, the results are easy to scan. But in full-text search, there are often
too many matches for the user to see them all. Instead, the algorithm has to
sort them according to some measure of relevance. Relevance metrics are
often mathematically complex; researchers don’t generally know which met-
ric they’re using; in the case of web search, the metric may be proprietary.
In short, full-text search is not a finding aid analogous to a card catalog.
It’s a name for a large family of algorithms that humanists have been using
for several decades to test hypotheses and sort documents by relevance to
their hypothesis. Simple forms of full-text search were already available in
the 1970s (Lexis was an early example), but CD-ROM databases of historical
sources weren’t widely distributed until the 1990s. Even today, the technol-
ogy may not have permeated the discipline of history as deeply as it has
literary studies, since historians rely more heavily on unpublished sources.
One recent study suggests, however, that humanists across a range of dis-
ciplines rely heavily on search engines, and use them for research in ways
that are not very different from the way the general public uses them. (Like
everyone else, we begin with Google.)1 The scholarly consequences of
search practices are difficult to assess, since scholars tend to suppress
description of their own discovery process in published work.2 But as some-
one who began a dissertation just before full-text databases became avail-
able, I remember that I seemed to be finishing it in a different world.
The most obvious effect of the new technology was that, like many other
literary scholars in the ’90s, I found myself writing about a wider range of
primary sources. But I suspect that the questions scholars posed also changed
to exploit the affordances of full-text search. Before 1990, narrowly defined
themes were difficult to mine: there was no Library of Congress subject
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heading for ‘‘descriptions of work as ‘energy’ in British Romantic-era writing.’’
Full-text search made that kind of topic ridiculously easy to explore. If you
could associate a theme with a set of verbal tics, you could suddenly turn up
dozens of citations not mentioned in existing scholarship and discover
something that was easy to call ‘‘a discourse.’’
I remember feeling uneasy about this. The rules of the research game
seemed to have changed in a way that made it impossible to lose. After all,
how many sources do you need to establish the importance of a theme?
Twenty? When searches were limited by networks of previous citations, that
was a meaningfully high bar. But in a database containing millions of sen-
tences, full-text search can turn up twenty examples of anything. Even at the
time, it was clear that this might strengthen confirmation bias.
In hindsight, I underestimated the scope of the problem. It’s true that
full-text search can confirm almost any thesis you bring to it, but that may
not be its most dangerous feature. The deeper problem is that sorting
sources in order of relevance to your query also tends to filter out all the
alternative theses you didn’t bring. Search is a form of data mining, but
a strangely focused form that only shows you what you already know to
expect. This limitation would be a problem in any domain, but it’s partic-
ularly acute in historical research, since other periods don’t always organize
their knowledge in ways we find intuitive. Our guesses about search terms
may well project contemporary associations and occlude unfamiliar patterns
of thought.
Humanists didn’t spend a lot of time debating this problem in the
1990s, because search engines were usually our only mode of access to large
digital collections. But in recent years, research practices have diversified,
and the hermeneutic limitations of search are becoming obvious. In com-
puter science, the subfields of data mining and machine learning have
specialized in the problem of extracting knowledge from large collections.3
They’ve developed a range of alternatives to search based on a more self-
conscious, philosophically rigorous account of interpretation.
I realize that last sentence may be an eye-opener. Humanists tend to
think of computer science as an instrumental rather than philosophical
discourse. The term ‘‘data mining’’ makes it easy to envision the field as a
collection of mining ‘‘tools.’’ But that’s not an accurate picture. The under-
lying language of data mining—Bayesian statistics—is a way of reasoning
about interpretation that can help us approach large collections in a more
principled way.4 In particular, it emphasizes a hermeneutic spiral that will
be familiar to humanists, acknowledging that we approach every question
with some previous assumptions (called ‘‘prior probabilities’’), as well as
particular kinds of uncertainty. When we encounter new evidence, our
interpretation is at once shaped by existing assumptions and (possibly)
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capable of reshaping them. This hermeneutic cycle is intuitive enough when
we’re talking about a single text; the task of data mining is to explain how it
can work at the level of a collection too large to be surveyed by a single
reader. All mapping strategies are going to make some assumptions about
the patterns we expect to find. But some strategies are also able to reveal
evidence that challenges prior assumptions.
For instance, literary scholars’ habit of using keyword search to probe
for intersections of themes (like ‘‘blush/shame’’ or ‘‘work/energy’’) is tacitly
based on an assumption that the co-occurrence of words will reveal a con-
nection between their meanings. This assumption is related to a model of
meaning that linguists call the ‘‘distributional hypothesis,’’ which postulates
that the meaning of a word is related to its distribution across contexts.5 This
may not be a perfect model, but it has proven to be a useful one in computer
science as well as literary study, and if we want to continue using it as
a heuristic, there are more flexible ways to use it than iteratively guessing
particular pairs of words. Algorithms based on distributional assumptions
can map the language that was in practice associated with any term in a given
period.6 For instance, the word most commonly associated with ‘‘blush’’ in
a collection of 4,820 eighteenth- and nineteenth-century volumes turns out
to be not ‘‘shame’’ but ‘‘artless’’—a detail that might interestingly complicate
a scholar’s assumptions about moral consciousness, if they use an exploratory
strategy flexible enough to reveal it.7 Mapping strategies like this won’t
replace keyword search for all purposes. When you already know what you’re
looking for, a search engine is the appropriate tool. But in historical schol-
arship, there are times when we don’t know what we’re looking for as well as
we think.
In fact, perhaps it’s already hasty to assume that the topic I’m exploring
can be associated with a single word like ‘‘blush.’’ Maybe a different term,
that I can’t begin to guess, was more important in this period, or maybe the
social phenomena relevant to my question take shape at the intersection of
many different terms. If we want a more open-ended strategy, we can map
the print record by allowing an algorithm to organize the language of a col-
lection into clusters of terms that tend to occur in the same contexts. This
strategy (known as ‘‘topic modeling’’) is capable of revealing discursive
patterns that the researcher didn’t necessarily go looking for.8
Because topic modeling allows a word to belong to more than one
‘‘topic,’’ it can reveal patterns of association that shift across time. Figure 1,
for instance, plots occurrences of ‘‘laugh’’ (and words derived from that
root) in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century poetry, dividing the occur-
rences by their association with three different algorithmically created
topics.9 It would be possible to consider each topic separately—in fact, that’s
how topic modeling is commonly used—but here I’ve added an additional
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twist by showing how references to laughter are so to speak passed from one
topic to another over time. (The algorithm also created 117 other topics;
these are only the three where ‘‘laugh-’’ occurred most often.) Each topic is
labeled with its most common words, giving us a sense of the changing con-
texts where poets mention laughter. A contrast is visible between the public,
satirical function of ‘‘laughter’’ in much eighteenth-century poetry and a dif-
ferent pair of contexts where laughter is associated with personal description
of a sentimental or amatory kind (‘‘sweet,’’ ‘‘fair,’’ ‘‘eyes’’). This use of laughter
for characterization is already present in the eighteenth century, but becomes
more prominent as the association of laughter with public wit fades.
I don’t mean to imply a causal connection between these changes (for
one thing, there are many other topics in the model; these three don’t
constitute a closed system). The illustration is only meant to show how topic
modeling can generate suggestive leads. But pursued in more depth, leads
become results. Matthew Jockers has used topic modeling to map
nineteenth-century novels; Robert K. Nelson has used it to correlate the-
matic emphases in a Civil War-era newspaper with the changing fortunes of
figure 1. Occurrences of ‘‘laugh,’’ ‘‘laughter,’’ etc. in a collection of 13,789
volumes of poetry, divided by the topic to which each occurrence was
assigned. Among 120 topics, I have plotted the three where ‘‘laugh-’’
occurs most often; each topic is labeled with its most frequent words.
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the war. Andrew Goldstone and I have used the technique to chart the rise
and fall of different critical vocabularies in twentieth-century literary
study.10
Instead of dwelling specifically on topic modeling, I want to consider the
way innovations of this kind are prompting a belated conversation about
algorithmic exploration in general. Topic modeling will be and should be
controversial—as full-text search, actually, should have been controversial
twenty years ago. Researchers can never afford to treat algorithms as black
boxes that generate mysterious authority. If we’re going to use algorithms in
our research, we have to crack them open and find out how they work. Topic
modeling, fortunately, is not proprietary, like many algorithms behind web
search. Topic modeling algorithms are public, and humanists have proven to
be quite capable of understanding them and changing them to fit humanistic
goals.
To understand the interpretive limitations of an algorithm, one needs to
understand its mathematical basis. For instance, in the most common form
of topic modeling, the number of topics to be produced is one of the initial
assumptions brought to the modeling process. As a consequence, the algo-
rithm can’t provide authoritative answers about the unity of any discourse,
or about its boundaries. It’s always possible to model the same collection
with a larger or smaller number of topics, which would lump or split results
differently. On the other hand, the algorithm is quite good at revealing
patterns of association we might otherwise overlook.
Using algorithms for discovery raises an interesting but unfamiliar set of
philosophical questions. Humanists are still more comfortable with quanti-
tative methods when they can be presented in their familiar role as instru-
ments of verification in the late stages of research. Using an algorithm as
a source of initial leads seems perilously close to pulling a rabbit out of a hat
(in spite of the fact that we’ve been doing this with search engines for several
decades). In a recent issue of PMLA, for instance, Alan Liu wonders whether
topic modelers aspire to the goal of ‘‘tabula rasa interpretation—the initiation
of interpretation through the hypothesis-free discovery of phenomena.’’11
If this were true, it would create a real philosophical impasse. And one
can certainly find technophilic rhapsodies in Wired magazine suggesting
that we have reached that impasse: an endgame where ‘‘data’’ finally dis-
places all ‘‘theory.’’12 But those rhapsodies are not well informed about the
statistical models involved in data mining. It isn’t the case that topic mod-
eling (or any other data mining algorithm) pretends to be truly ‘‘hypothesis-
free.’’ A model is an abstraction created by human beings, and computer
scientists have long acknowledged this.13 The Bayesian probabilistic models
now common in the discipline are especially meticulous about specifying
initial interpretive assumptions.
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A researcher who wants to fit a topic model to a collection of documents
has to start by specifying, for instance, the number of topics she expects to
find and the degree of blurriness she expects those topics to possess. In the
modeling process, the computer doesn’t generate insights from nothing; its
calculations are rather a way of harmonizing these initial human assump-
tions with the complex evidence presented by the documents themselves.
(To use a term of art, the computer helps us ‘‘fit’’ a model to the evidence.)
This mode of exploration can be more open-ended than keyword search,
since assumptions about degrees of blurriness are more flexible than a spe-
cific assumption that, say, blushes will symbolize shame. But the interpretive
process is still shaped and initiated by human assumptions.
I haven’t had room here to make a detailed argument about the human-
istic value of quantitative methods.14 But doing that would be almost beside
the point, since humanists are already mining large datasets quantitatively
every time we use a web browser. The problem is that we are using search
algorithms we have never theorized, and arguably using them in a strongly
projective way that is at odds with historicism. Although the statistical
language of computer science may seem alien to our disciplinary tradition,
I think the paradoxical truth is that humanists will need to understand that
language in order to design research practices that allow us to work in
large collections while remaining true to our own hermeneutic principles.
This is admittedly a new kind of interdisciplinary conversation for huma-
nists, and we may initially have a lot to learn. But we also have a lot to
contribute. I’ve suggested that quantitative disciplines have their own useful
version of hermeneutic theory, but they aren’t without blind spots. The
difficulty of modeling historical change, for instance, is not well understood
outside the humanities. Scientists who try to model the print record over
a significant time span often make assumptions about continuity that huma-
nists would recognize as confining.15 On this topic, and many others, a rare
opportunity is emerging for a genuinely productive exchange between sci-
entific methodology and humanistic theory.
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